Semana 13: The Road to Denmark, Mungiu-Pippidi
Central Idea: “The historical road to the
contemporary state should not be seen as a linear progression toward less
patrimonialism on the one hand and more democracy and accountability on the
other. As welfare and development tasks shift from the community to the
government, there is an accompanying increase in corruption opportunities and a
loss of traditional systems of self-control over common goods” (75). It
does not make sense to copy the current structures of anticorruption achievers,
as this does not take their development or social context into account. It is
more useful to look at their historical development, as previous forms of
contemporary anticorruption achievers are more similar to current middle and
low-income countries and their governments.
·
The
analyzed cases (Denmark, Great Britain, France) took different routes, but
their specific context in the 18th and 19th centuries
allowed for the rule of law, an autonomous bureaucracy, and political
socialization of new groups to be achieved before their governments attempted
to enfranchise their entire populations. This situation is rare in the world at
large, especially in countries where free elections are achieved before the
rule of law or political accountability.
·
Modern
states have more responsibilities than their predecessors, as well as the added
responsibility of seeking the common good if they are liberal democracies. “It
may be freer of traditional privilege, more merit-oriented, and more objective,
but it also has far more tasks to perform than people or traditional
communities used to undertake before by themselves and far more resources as
well” (75).
Three different routes to good governance and
corruption control are analyzed in the following successful cases:
-
The Danish model. An enlightened despot centralized
power and gradually replaced the traditional nobility with middle-class
bureaucrats who are sworn in directly by the king and rely on income from their
public office (i.e. their loyalty to the king) to sustain themselves, later
setting this arrangement into a constitution. This process was gradual and took
about 160 years (from the creation of the absolute monarchy under Frederick III
in 1660 to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when only about 10% of Danish civil
servants were nobles and it was mandatory for them to hold a law degree). It gave
good results by creating a context where the government is accountable to civil
society because it needs it to form its bureaucracy, and civil society is
accountable to the government because civil society only has power by
participating in the government’s meritocratic system. However, the process may
only be an option for smaller polities with clearly delineated borders (such as
island nations or Asian monarchies).
-
The Revolutionary model. Example: France. The French
Revolution seeks to do away with favoritism and particularism in favor of
meritocracy and equal representation, as it is considered that corruption is a part
of human nature that must be prevented instead of punished. The main difference
between this model and the others is that an overhaul of the system happens,
the bureaucracy’s ties to local systems of governance remains by allowing the
government to be managed by an elite. While it achieves an overhaul of the old
system (l’Ancien Regime), it leaves the political system open to factions and
patronage, mostly with local ties that remain similar to the old regime.
Similar to the United States, it included “phases of intense politicization,
public resources spoiling, and favoritism –challenges very similar to those
facing today’s middle-income developing countries” (74). The process took about
80 years (from the first attempts at transparency in Louis XVI’s Estates
General, which directly caused the French Revolution in 1789, to the creation
of the Third Republic in 1870, when the republican form of government was
established and attention was directed at colonial expansion).
-
The Reform model. Example: Great Britain. Especially
after the colonial reconfiguration brought on by the Seven Years War in the
1760s (when Great Britain gained Canada and India from France and Portugal), it
was clear that the British model of private colonialism was not getting as many
resources to the government’s coffers as it should. This led to parliamentary
oversight reform that changed the colonies’ political status (first by taking
them from the private companies that managed them and making them Crown
colonies, then by turning them into Dominions of the Crown) and began the
creation of a professional civil service. Given the legislative basis of these
changes, they took around 50 years to complete (from the 1780s to around 1840,
when the British Raj was formally established in India) and involved active
participation by a “parliament and the local civil society that debated,
investigated, and gradually adopted reforms to foster public integrity” (72).
Instead of taking these specific contexts into
account, modern anticorruption studies focus on recommending that countries
enact a set of institutions (also called “pillars”) that are presumed to fight
corruption by just existing at the same time. These are:
·
An elected legislature
·
An honest and strong executive
·
An independent and accountable
judicial system
·
An independent auditor general (usually subordinate to the
legislature)
·
An ombudsman
·
A specialized and independent
anticorruption agency
·
An honest and nonpoliticized civil
service or bureaucracy
·
Honest and efficient local governments
·
Independent and free media
·
A civil society able to promote
integrity
·
Responsible, honest corporations.
·
An international framework for
integrity. For
example, being a party to international treaties and standards on
anticorruption practices. (76)
The main problem with assuming that the mere
existence of these institutions will fight corruption lies in the fact that
each of them was developed at a different point in time in the above models.
·
Bureaucracies
had a relatively small role in earlier European politics, as civil service
posts were filled by appointed citizens and seen as a civic duty, not as a job
that would allow anyone to make a living. Denmark changed this in the 17th
century, but it took more than a century for it to become an entrenched
practice.
·
Independent
judiciaries were also relatively recent, with Great Britain being the leader in
the field and only creating its current judiciary around the mid-19th
century. Even then, it had to count on a specific equilibrium between the
judiciary being professional and respected, and coexisting with a government
that was willing to give up some of its power to the judiciary. “An independent judiciary did not lead to
the historical development of control of corruption, but seems rather to have
been a result of it, its development determined mostly by politics” (78).
·
Montesquieu’s
separation of powers was a popular idea since the 18th century, but
it was difficult to implement. Having separate and independent executives and
legislative bodies is a relatively recent development in Europe.
·
General
auditors and ombudsmen were also a relatively recent creation in 18th
and 19th century Sweden, respectively, and they worked due to specific
contexts. While their powers are relatively limited (“It relies upon a
reputation for impartiality and integrity, but formally has remarkable few
powers; the ombudsman can make recommendations but cannot reverse decisions”
and “the auditor was the arm of the sovereign who checked on his subjects, not
the arm of an elected legislature who checked on government” (78)), they were
successful in Sweden “because of demand from strong political challengers and
public opinion sensitive to issues of corruption and abuse. In other words,
there was high demand for government accountability that reflected the
existence of a powerful opposition challenging the existing equilibrium.
Similar to judicial independence, these
institutions were a result of specific historical Western transitions to
control of corruption rather than their cause” (79).
México es uno de los casos en los cuales la mera existencia de estos
pilares no ha garantizado una lucha anticorrupción efectiva. Esto se debe a
dificultades relacionadas con la evolución específica del arreglo social
mexicano, así como la respuesta de sus instituciones políticas al mismo a
través de la Constitución de 1917.
·
México
posiblemente ha tenido momentos en los cuales encaja en los tres modelos
descritos por Mungiu-Pippidi. El modelo danés del déspota ilustrado que después
busca profesionalizar al servicio civil y plasmarlo en la constitución
posiblemente puede observarse en las acciones de Porfirio Díaz antes de la
Revolución Mexicana. Las reformas traídas por el Maximato tras la Revolución,
especialmente las relacionadas con el reparto agrario y la nacionalización de
recursos, así como gran parte del siglo XX bajo el PRI, posiblemente pueden
verse como acordes al modelo revolucionario. Finalmente, es posible que la interacción
actual entre organizaciones de la sociedad civil y un gobierno no enteramente
dispuesto a soltar parte de su poder en aras de luchar contra la corrupción
encaje en el modelo reformista visto en Gran Bretaña. Las primeras dos etapas
se han suspendido semiabruptamente, mientras que la tercera posiblemente esté
en curso.
·
La
separación de poderes no se logró después de 1917 debido a que el sistema
priísta dependía directamente de que el presidente tuviera la lealtad de su
partido y el control de las demás ramas del gobierno. Tampoco se ha podido
lograr tras la transición democrática debido a que el arreglo constitucional
está diseñado para permitir el escenario anterior, y como se vio con Vicente
Fox, incluye un federalismo altamente volátil en el cual los gobernadores no
están comprometidos a un grado mínimo de rendición de cuentas hacia la
federación ni hacia sus ciudadanos.
·
Similarmente
a Suecia, la Auditoría Superior de la Federación se creó para que el gobierno
supervisara a sus propios burócratas (particularmente para que la Cámara de
Diputados supervisara al Ejecutivo), mas no para que el gobierno se supervisara
a sí mismo. La reforma de 1999 bajo Zedillo cambió este arreglo, mas no el
contexto en el cual la ASF queda subordinada a estándares desventajosos al
momento de armar casos contra cualquier ente auditada. Si bien la ASF quedó
menos aislada con el Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, este contexto no cambió.
·
La
creación de un servicio civil de carrera en México no sucedió hasta 2002, y
desde entonces se ha cooptado por prácticas patrimonialistas donde se abusa de
la cláusula de excepción (es decir, que un contratado puede saltarse los
estándares del Servicio Profesional de Carrera si sus superiores declaran que
es necesario hacer una excepción en su caso) y, sobre todo tras la casi
desaparición de la Secretaría de la Función Pública, se le ha dejado de
supervisar por al menos tres años (desde 2013).
·
El papel
de los medios de comunicación, las corporaciones y la sociedad civil promotora
de la integridad ha sido debilitado por una participación activa del gobierno
en las tres esferas. El gobierno financia a los medios de comunicación a través
de un enorme gasto en publicidad oficial y, tras las reformas del sexenio de
Salinas, participa activamente en el sector privado con joint ventures y
licitaciones negociadas antes de ser competidas. Ante este escenario, la
sociedad civil queda dividida entre una sobrecarga de información sesgada por
publicidad oficial y una dependencia de financiamiento del gobierno, aunque no
formen parte del sector público.
·
Finalmente,
si bien México ha firmado tratados internacionales contra la corrupción en los
marcos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y la Organización para la
Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos, no ha quedado claro hasta qué punto los
gobiernos mexicanos de después del año 2000 están comprometidos con su
implementación. Si bien los compromisos legales de incluir las medidas
acordadas en las leyes mexicanas sí se han llevado a cabo, se ha reportado
desde 2015 que no es así con la implementación de esas mismas leyes. Tampoco
queda claro qué otros tipos de participación en el ámbito internacional podrían
llevar a un “international framework for integrity”.
Para la siguiente clase, leer:
1.
¿Por qué
Mungiu-Pippidi dice que la competencia no ese en sí misma un antídoto para el
particularismo o para el patrimonialismo?
2.
¿Por qué
la interacción entre las cuatro ataduras normativas lleva a empoderar el
universalismo ético?
3.
¿Cómo es
que las ataduras normativas pueden pasar a convertirse en normas de gobernanza?
