PFHCSC: Semana 13, Corrupción y Estado de derecho: El caso de Dinamarca

Semana 13: The Road to Denmark, Mungiu-Pippidi

Central Idea: “The historical road to the contemporary state should not be seen as a linear progression toward less patrimonialism on the one hand and more democracy and accountability on the other. As welfare and development tasks shift from the community to the government, there is an accompanying increase in corruption opportunities and a loss of traditional systems of self-control over common goods” (75). It does not make sense to copy the current structures of anticorruption achievers, as this does not take their development or social context into account. It is more useful to look at their historical development, as previous forms of contemporary anticorruption achievers are more similar to current middle and low-income countries and their governments.

·         The analyzed cases (Denmark, Great Britain, France) took different routes, but their specific context in the 18^th and 19^th centuries allowed for the rule of law, an autonomous bureaucracy, and political socialization of new groups to be achieved before their governments attempted to enfranchise their entire populations. This situation is rare in the world at large, especially in countries where free elections are achieved before the rule of law or political accountability.

·         Modern states have more responsibilities than their predecessors, as well as the added responsibility of seeking the common good if they are liberal democracies. “It may be freer of traditional privilege, more merit-oriented, and more objective, but it also has far more tasks to perform than people or traditional communities used to undertake before by themselves and far more resources as well” (75).

Three different routes to good governance and corruption control are analyzed in the following successful cases:

-          The Danish model. An enlightened despot centralized power and gradually replaced the traditional nobility with middle-class bureaucrats who are sworn in directly by the king and rely on income from their public office (i.e. their loyalty to the king) to sustain themselves, later setting this arrangement into a constitution. This process was gradual and took about 160 years (from the creation of the absolute monarchy under Frederick III in 1660 to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when only about 10% of Danish civil servants were nobles and it was mandatory for them to hold a law degree). It gave good results by creating a context where the government is accountable to civil society because it needs it to form its bureaucracy, and civil society is accountable to the government because civil society only has power by participating in the government’s meritocratic system. However, the process may only be an option for smaller polities with clearly delineated borders (such as island nations or Asian monarchies).

-          The Revolutionary model. Example: France. The French Revolution seeks to do away with favoritism and particularism in favor of meritocracy and equal representation, as it is considered that corruption is a part of human nature that must be prevented instead of punished. The main difference between this model and the others is that an overhaul of the system happens, the bureaucracy’s ties to local systems of governance remains by allowing the government to be managed by an elite. While it achieves an overhaul of the old system (l’Ancien Regime), it leaves the political system open to factions and patronage, mostly with local ties that remain similar to the old regime. Similar to the United States, it included “phases of intense politicization, public resources spoiling, and favoritism –challenges very similar to those facing today’s middle-income developing countries” (74). The process took about 80 years (from the first attempts at transparency in Louis XVI’s Estates General, which directly caused the French Revolution in 1789, to the creation of the Third Republic in 1870, when the republican form of government was established and attention was directed at colonial expansion).

-          The Reform model. Example: Great Britain. Especially after the colonial reconfiguration brought on by the Seven Years War in the 1760s (when Great Britain gained Canada and India from France and Portugal), it was clear that the British model of private colonialism was not getting as many resources to the government’s coffers as it should. This led to parliamentary oversight reform that changed the colonies’ political status (first by taking them from the private companies that managed them and making them Crown colonies, then by turning them into Dominions of the Crown) and began the creation of a professional civil service. Given the legislative basis of these changes, they took around 50 years to complete (from the 1780s to around 1840, when the British Raj was formally established in India) and involved active participation by a “parliament and the local civil society that debated, investigated, and gradually adopted reforms to foster public integrity” (72).

Instead of taking these specific contexts into account, modern anticorruption studies focus on recommending that countries enact a set of institutions (also called “pillars”) that are presumed to fight corruption by just existing at the same time. These are:

·         An elected legislature

·         An honest and strong executive

·         An independent and accountable judicial system

·         An independent auditor general (usually subordinate to the legislature)

·         An ombudsman

·         A specialized and independent anticorruption agency

·         An honest and nonpoliticized civil service or bureaucracy

·         Honest and efficient local governments

·         Independent and free media

·         A civil society able to promote integrity

·         Responsible, honest corporations.

·         An international framework for integrity. For example, being a party to international treaties and standards on anticorruption practices. (76)

The main problem with assuming that the mere existence of these institutions will fight corruption lies in the fact that each of them was developed at a different point in time in the above models.

·         Bureaucracies had a relatively small role in earlier European politics, as civil service posts were filled by appointed citizens and seen as a civic duty, not as a job that would allow anyone to make a living. Denmark changed this in the 17^th century, but it took more than a century for it to become an entrenched practice.

·         Independent judiciaries were also relatively recent, with Great Britain being the leader in the field and only creating its current judiciary around the mid-19^th century. Even then, it had to count on a specific equilibrium between the judiciary being professional and respected, and coexisting with a government that was willing to give up some of its power to the judiciary. “An independent judiciary did not lead to the historical development of control of corruption, but seems rather to have been a result of it, its development determined mostly by politics” (78).

·         Montesquieu’s separation of powers was a popular idea since the 18^th century, but it was difficult to implement. Having separate and independent executives and legislative bodies is a relatively recent development in Europe.

·         General auditors and ombudsmen were also a relatively recent creation in 18^th and 19^th century Sweden, respectively, and they worked due to specific contexts. While their powers are relatively limited (“It relies upon a reputation for impartiality and integrity, but formally has remarkable few powers; the ombudsman can make recommendations but cannot reverse decisions” and “the auditor was the arm of the sovereign who checked on his subjects, not the arm of an elected legislature who checked on government” (78)), they were successful in Sweden “because of demand from strong political challengers and public opinion sensitive to issues of corruption and abuse. In other words, there was high demand for government accountability that reflected the existence of a powerful opposition challenging the existing equilibrium. Similar to judicial independence, these institutions were a result of specific historical Western transitions to control of corruption rather than their cause” (79).

México es uno de los casos en los cuales la mera existencia de estos pilares no ha garantizado una lucha anticorrupción efectiva. Esto se debe a dificultades relacionadas con la evolución específica del arreglo social mexicano, así como la respuesta de sus instituciones políticas al mismo a través de la Constitución de 1917.

·         México posiblemente ha tenido momentos en los cuales encaja en los tres modelos descritos por Mungiu-Pippidi. El modelo danés del déspota ilustrado que después busca profesionalizar al servicio civil y plasmarlo en la constitución posiblemente puede observarse en las acciones de Porfirio Díaz antes de la Revolución Mexicana. Las reformas traídas por el Maximato tras la Revolución, especialmente las relacionadas con el reparto agrario y la nacionalización de recursos, así como gran parte del siglo XX bajo el PRI, posiblemente pueden verse como acordes al modelo revolucionario. Finalmente, es posible que la interacción actual entre organizaciones de la sociedad civil y un gobierno no enteramente dispuesto a soltar parte de su poder en aras de luchar contra la corrupción encaje en el modelo reformista visto en Gran Bretaña. Las primeras dos etapas se han suspendido semiabruptamente, mientras que la tercera posiblemente esté en curso.

·         La separación de poderes no se logró después de 1917 debido a que el sistema priísta dependía directamente de que el presidente tuviera la lealtad de su partido y el control de las demás ramas del gobierno. Tampoco se ha podido lograr tras la transición democrática debido a que el arreglo constitucional está diseñado para permitir el escenario anterior, y como se vio con Vicente Fox, incluye un federalismo altamente volátil en el cual los gobernadores no están comprometidos a un grado mínimo de rendición de cuentas hacia la federación ni hacia sus ciudadanos.

·         Similarmente a Suecia, la Auditoría Superior de la Federación se creó para que el gobierno supervisara a sus propios burócratas (particularmente para que la Cámara de Diputados supervisara al Ejecutivo), mas no para que el gobierno se supervisara a sí mismo. La reforma de 1999 bajo Zedillo cambió este arreglo, mas no el contexto en el cual la ASF queda subordinada a estándares desventajosos al momento de armar casos contra cualquier ente auditada. Si bien la ASF quedó menos aislada con el Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, este contexto no cambió.

·         La creación de un servicio civil de carrera en México no sucedió hasta 2002, y desde entonces se ha cooptado por prácticas patrimonialistas donde se abusa de la cláusula de excepción (es decir, que un contratado puede saltarse los estándares del Servicio Profesional de Carrera si sus superiores declaran que es necesario hacer una excepción en su caso) y, sobre todo tras la casi desaparición de la Secretaría de la Función Pública, se le ha dejado de supervisar por al menos tres años (desde 2013).

·         El papel de los medios de comunicación, las corporaciones y la sociedad civil promotora de la integridad ha sido debilitado por una participación activa del gobierno en las tres esferas. El gobierno financia a los medios de comunicación a través de un enorme gasto en publicidad oficial y, tras las reformas del sexenio de Salinas, participa activamente en el sector privado con joint ventures y licitaciones negociadas antes de ser competidas. Ante este escenario, la sociedad civil queda dividida entre una sobrecarga de información sesgada por publicidad oficial y una dependencia de financiamiento del gobierno, aunque no formen parte del sector público.

·         Finalmente, si bien México ha firmado tratados internacionales contra la corrupción en los marcos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos, no ha quedado claro hasta qué punto los gobiernos mexicanos de después del año 2000 están comprometidos con su implementación. Si bien los compromisos legales de incluir las medidas acordadas en las leyes mexicanas sí se han llevado a cabo, se ha reportado desde 2015 que no es así con la implementación de esas mismas leyes. Tampoco queda claro qué otros tipos de participación en el ámbito internacional podrían llevar a un “international framework for integrity”.

Para la siguiente clase, leer:

“Controlling Corruption through Collective Action” de Alina Mungiu-Pippidi: https://www.dropbox.com/s/3ddzz7fp75709z8/Mungiu-Pippidi_Controlling%20corruption%20through%20collective%20action.pdf?dl=0

1.       ¿Por qué Mungiu-Pippidi dice que la competencia no ese en sí misma un antídoto para el particularismo o para el patrimonialismo?

2.       ¿Por qué la interacción entre las cuatro ataduras normativas lleva a empoderar el universalismo ético?

3.       ¿Cómo es que las ataduras normativas pueden pasar a convertirse en normas de gobernanza?